jective right or duty to the legislator’s will, the will-theory of private law also implies that the legal relationship between the debtor and the creditor is supernatural to its nature.128 This is due to the fact that the will-theory understands a right or a duty as existing prior to a lawsuit, an understanding of legal rights and duties that in turn has exerted a considerable influence over the understanding of legal rights on the part of both the legislator and the common consciousness of law. But in reality the actual existence and content of a right or duty depends upon the outcome of a lawsuit, for this is how a judge proceeds when he decides a case, he quite simply accords the winning party with the disputed right, and the losing party with a corresponding duty, and does so without reference to any rights that, so to say, exist prior to the trial.129 However, what is most damning to the validity of the will-theory is its conception of the nature of the relationship between the different parties to a contract.According to the will-theory of ancient times,the contract between the debtor and the creditor provided the creditor with a supernatural power over the debtor’s will and personality.130 And since this specific conception of rights and duties is commonly occurring among practitioners of law andwithin the common consciousness of law, the natural conclusion is that the legislator himself has the actual power to intervene in natural, physical reality and institute real rights and duties, albeit via a detour over the supernatural world, lies close at hand.131 Only that such a conception of law-making impossibly can be correct, as it is not founded upon any realistic understanding of legal, natural, or logical causality: p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 3 420 128 See, e.g., Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 127-137; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 207-222; “Naturrätt?,” pp. 321-322. 129 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 124-126; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 319-321. 130 Hägerström,“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 581-591; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 24-36;“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 128-129;“Declaration of Intention,” pp. 323324. 131 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 128; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 323.
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