addition, the shift from a pragmatic to an idealistic doctrine of sources also resulted in a reconstruction of the concept of subjective rights.This entailed that the Roman view of rights, according to which the primary element of ius was the right to an action entitling a legal use of force, was abandoned for the modern view, wherein the legal claimper se (the right) and its corollary the subjection to a legal claim (duty) constituted the primary ingredient of ius. Hence, the “modern” view entails that claims are “rights,” and are so regardless of whether or not one has the legal power, right, or potential to actually look after and safeguard one’s “rights”. This discrepancy between actual rights and potential rights is what Hägerström considers to be a distinguishing feature of the history of classical natural law, namely that it emphasized the right as a claim, thus making the right to execution secondary.This was due to the fact that natural law during the 17th and 18th Centuries (during the lives of Grotius, Pufendorf,Thomasius,andGundling) reformulated the notion of right. Ius naturale retained its status as a moral order aimed at directing the social co-existence of men. However, in connection to ius naturale men had natural rights, among them the right to place other men under obligation, within certain limits.An additional power belonging to the private right was the power use force in order to secure one’s rights, but this power over the debtor was not physical but ideal or moral, what was primary was thus the claim rather than actual execution of the rightful claim.112 In addition, natural law construed the creation of rightful obligations a function of the wills of the involved parties, thus the right as such was considered to constitute a quality intrinsic to the will rather than a direct function of external factors such as observance of positive rules of law.113 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 413 72-74; Kaser, Ius gentium, pp. 55-56; Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft, pp. 17-19 and 110-112. 112 Hägerström,“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 596-597; Recht, Pflicht etc, p. 44. 113 Cf. Hägerström,“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” p. 597; Recht, Pflicht etc, p. 45.
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