But there still existed a difference between the rules of ius civile, gentium, and naturale; for they were systems of law that had different degrees of positivity and universality, from the particularity of Roman law, which only applied within Rome and to Roman affairs, over the geographic universality of ius gentium, the law of nations and peoples, to the philosophical univerality of ius naturale, the law of nature and men.103 These differences with regard to positivity and universality were on the main strictly respected by Roman law and lawyers, who only applied ius civile and ius gentiumin legal affairs, since ius naturale was more an ideal than a real system of law.104 Ius gentium was in reality not Roman law proper, but system of customs of law that were considered to belong to all nations and peoples, such as, for instance:“die Kraft der formlosenTradition, Eigentum zu übertragen, originärer Eigentumserwerb durch Okkupation von res nullius, promissio als obligationsbegründenden,Obligation durch mutuum, obligation ex consensu.”105 Regardless, any right acquired by means of ius gentiumwere in the dealings between Roman citizens just as entitling as those acquired through ius civile, that is, endowing the claimant anactio.The rights of foreigners were, however, restricted vis-à-vis Romans. In the course of time, ius gentiumcame to be identified with Greek notions of law, such as ius naturale. However, in contrast to ius civile and ius gentium, ius naturale was only a moral order for the benefit of society (similar to the Roman notion of aequum et bonum) whose foundations were to be found in natural reason, naturalis ratio.106 Hägerström continues: p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 2 410 103 Cf. Sauter, Phil. Grundlagen, p. 76; Kaser, Ius gentium, pp. 54-74. 104 Buckland, Roman Private Law, p. 29; Sauter, Phil. Grundlagen, p. 76; Schiller, Roman Law: Mechanisms of Development, pp. 556-560; Kaser, Ius gentium, pp. 59-64. However, Wieacker,Römische Rechtsgeschichte:Quellenkunde,Rechtsbildung, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsliteratur, Abschnitt 1, Einleitung, Quellenkunde, Frühzeit und Republik, pp. 444-445, 473474, and 510. 105 Hägerström, “Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” p. 595; Recht, Pflicht etc, p. 41. Swedish:“den formlösa traditionens kraft att överföra egendom, originärt egendomsförvärv genom ockupering av res nullius, promissio såsom obligationsgrundande, obligation genom mutuum, obligation ex consensu.” 106 Hägerström,“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” p. 595; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 41-42. See also Kaser, Ius gentium, passim.
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