physical, formal and material alike).On the contrary,Hägerström holds that the revolution was incomplete, as jurisprudence had failed to take Kant’s critique to its logical conclusion and subject legal epistemology, methodology, and argumentation to similar tests, for jurists still continued to argue as if the rejection of metaphysical law had no real consequences for the fundamentals of positivistic legal epistemology, methodology, and argumentation. In fact, this failure to complete the anti-metaphysical revolution entailed that practical jurists and legal scholars continued to argue as if legal and jurisprudential argumentation could transcend the content of the sources of positive law, as well as to argue on topics as if it were possible to extend one’s conclusions beyond what was possible to prove materially.97 Consequently, it is safe to contend, as AndersVilhelm Lundstedt repeatedly did, that jurisprudence, despite its rejection of metaphysical law, continued to do what it had always done - that is, to perform legal analysis implementing the tools of the uncritical scholastic scientific dogmatism of the past millennium’s Romanist jurisprudence.98 If, as Hägerström argues, modern jurisprudence is permeated by natural law, then from a practical point of view private law, the law of obligations and things, is based upon an uncritical application of a series of mis- and over-interpretations of Roman law proper. Therefore, the practical goal of Hägerström’s analysis is to elucidate the internal relationship between private law, according to classical natural law, and private law, according to modern jurisprudence, in order to explain several of the peculiarities p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 2 408 97 Cf. Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 122-168;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 201256; Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 46-48. 98 See also AndersVilhelm Lundstedt’s works, which are far more polemical and explicit in the critique of contemporary jurisprudence, especially GermanBegriffsjurisprudenz. E.g., Lundstedt, “Kritik av nordiska skadeståndsläror,” pp. 55-57, n. 2 . 3 the hi storical t i e s betwe en natural law and legal pos i t ivi sm: pract ical problems and goals
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