the rules of Roman law proper.92 According to Roman law, the causality is the following: the power to obligare is a legal consequence that follows from the existence of a binding contract. In other words, the power toobligare is inseparable fromobligatio.The power toobligare is itself never a function of a violation of somebody’s dominium(which natural law and modern jurisprudence holds obligare to be).A violation of a person’s dominium, according to Roman law, will give the dominus, in this case the wronged party, a right to the legal remedy rei vindicatio. However, the violation of dominiumitself does not directly subject the violating party to anobligatio to behave in a certain way. Finally, neither does dominiumgive rise to universal obligations (addressed to all other individuals and legally obligating them to respect the dominiumof the dominus).Therefore, by reference to the legal consequences following fromobligatio anddominium, according to the original Roman texts, it can be concluded that the modern interpretation of Roman law of obligations and the law of things endows obligatio anddominiumwith meanings foreign to both the actual sources of Roman law as well as the prevailing opinion of Roman jurists.93 The natural lawyers’ interpretation of Roman law is thus characterized by an ideological taint, which expresses itself in the striving of natural law to create universally binding duties and rights, rather than through its scientific fidelity to the facts of law in general, and in this specific case Roman law in particular.And since the natural lawyers, instead of accepting that rights and duties actually have an historically based (rather than philosophically valid) form, content, and origin, they rather shape and formulate law after their own ideological notions of law, as well as what specific formal criteria that these prescripts ought to fulfill.94 p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 2 406 92 Hägerström,“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 604-622; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 53-76. 93 Cf. Hägerström,“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 604-622; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 53-76. 94 Cf., e.g., Hartung, Die Naturrechtsdebatte, pp. 69-82.
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