metaphysical philosophical realism, as it never succeeds in reaching beyond the investigated phenomena to “das Ding an sich”. In conclusion, since positive and rational law both in respect to history as well as any other aspect of reality constitute one another’s antithesis, then any attempt to apply positive law as a stepping-stone to the objective determination of law (a determination closely related to rational law) will fail. This is because in order for such an operation to succeed, the positive law of a certain time and place must, by means of a fiction, be elevated to the status of the absolute and objective scientific principle according to which the classification of the objective legal status of a (historical) fact is conducted, which in effects entails that an objective determination lacks proper scientific basis.45 Regardless of the fact that the reification of law and legal concepts constituted an historical phenomenonof superstitious origins (that were asserted to be abandoned by modern legal science), references to hereditary forms of legal reifications were still commonplace in modern jurisprudence.46 Since such concepts and notions lack the corresponding facts necessary for their verification, these concepts at best constitute nothing more than value judgments as to what these notions ought to mean.At worst, they are devoid of all sensible meaning.47 According to Hägerström’s analysis, the basis of these notions of metaphysical law lies in the assumed existence of an absolute legal concept (an absolute concept that in reality is extrapolated from the facts of positive law).This in turn made it possible for jurisprudence to claim the reality of actually existing rights and duties in the metaphysical sense.48 p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 1 390 45 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, p. 22. 46 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 46-47. 47 Ibid., pp. 22-25 and 26-27. 48 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 122-126;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 201-206; Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 46-48.
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