ultimately obliterates the distinction between private and public law.An observation that finally forces Hägerström, according to will-theory, to assume that there exists no facts corresponding exactly to our ideas and conception about the law of property and things.29 Hägerström’s description of Roman law as being predominantly founded upon an animistic worldview does not perhaps give an entirely accurate account of Roman legal thought in general.30 An accurate account of Roman law necessitates that Hägerström’s description is balanced by a passing reference to the pragmatic positivism of Roman lawyers, concluding: no actio - no right.The essentially super-natural origin of the legal system itself only served the practical purpose of lending Roman law extra legitimacy, but in essence, any claim lacking support in ius civile or ius gentiumconstituted an unenforceable claim, a legally unacknowledged right.31 Contrary to the Greek conception of law, the Romans in general, and Roman jurists in particular, consideredius naturale to be a mere philosophical window-dressing lacking everything but rhetorical value in legal affairs.32 For even if Roman jurists were under the influence of Greek philosophy, they did not: “das ganze Recht auf das aequum et bonum zurückführten und die Gültigkeit des Gesetzgebungsaktes naturrechtlich durch einen Konsensualvertrag zwischen den Volkgenossen erklärten.”33 To Roman judges, natural law neither a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 385 29 Hägerström, Obligationsbegriff 1, p. 4. 30 See, e.g., MacCormack,“Hägerström’s Magical Interpretation of Roman Law,” The Irish Jurist 4 (1969);“Formalism, Symbolism and Magic in Early Roman Law,”Tijdschrift voor rechtsgescheidenis 37 (1969). 31 See Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, pp. 28-33. Cf. Kaser, Ius gentium, p. 6; Robinson, The sources of Roman Law: Problems and Methods for Ancient Historians, pp. 26 and 40-41. Cf. Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 10-12; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 67-70. 32 Hägerström, Obligationsbegriff 1, p. 611. See also Part VII, Chapter 1 below. 33 Ibid. 1. 2 . 6 some obse rvat ions on the cri t ique of häge r ström’s studi e s of roman law
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