brought together in order to render the idea of a mutual parliamentary will possible.The will-theoreticians fictively contend that the decisions of a parliament in session express a unanimous will, thus treating these decisions as if they were unanimous on every point. However, this manifest use of fictions alters neither facts, nor the scientific conception of truth:“Und es wird wohl auch nicht die Anwendung der Fiktion im Recht die Unwahrheit wahr machen können!”18 In reality, what a parliament decides when it approves a bill constitutes a decision of the majority (which by definition does not need to be entirely unanimous on every point of a proposed statute in order for it to be valid) rather than a unanimous single will.19 The last resort of the will-theorists is the “will of the state”, which is a very peculiar figure, as the possessor of the will, the state, is a personage lacking all the usual characteristics of sentient and legally capable persons - that is, tangible physical existence, life, and real determinations.20 To such objections the will-theorists retort:“[Aber, sagt man,] es ist nicht derWille dieser oder jener besonderen Person oder derWille einer Sammlung von Personen, welcher sich im Recht ausdrückt, sondern es ist des Staates eigener Wille.Aber was ist denn der ‘Staat’, wenn nicht die durchRechtsregeln organisierte Gemeinschaft?”21 This, the abstract definition of the state’s will, obviously does not correspond to reality. In addition, even if the will of the state were to be reduced to its bare essentials, the actual mutual intentions of the citizens, then the theory would still have to be rejected, as it nevertheless still fails p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 1 382 1. 2 . 3 the “wi ll of the state” : the const i tut ionally indi f fe rent wi ll-theory 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Cf. Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 38-42; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 101105; Obligationsbegriff 1, pp. 12-13. 21 Hägerström, Obligationsbegriff 1, p. 14.
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