increase in the conceptual and theoretical problems of law rather than a decrease. Accordingly, the idea that the notions and concepts of law should be reduced to bare natural facts must be rejected, since jurisprudence in its attempts to dispel the mysterious nature of its fundamental concepts and principles tries to dissipate the fogwith smoke, which is done by it substituting one fantasy with an illusion.14 One reason to why legal science is troubled by problems of objectivity is that it assumes as one over-riding, but tacit, premiss that its dogmas shall be applied uncritically.15 This supposition forces legal positivism to use fictions in order to safeguard its first primary scientific premiss, namely that scientific law must correspond to facts. In the theoretical doctrine of sources, this methodological use of fictions manifests itself in the attempts to corroborate and maintain the will-theory, in particular by introduction of the supposition that law constitutes an expression of will of the supreme power of the land, the sovereign, and that the validity of the sources of law shall be judged by reference to this legislative will.16 However, this explains nothing, as it explains the validity of the different sources of law by reference to what in fact is a function of the sources of law, namely the state or social organization construed as a will-full person. In the monarchical state, the supreme power of the land is held to be identical to the monarch. However, since the monarch is merely human, an individual person, it is evident that it cannot p a r t v i , c h a p t e r 1 380 14 Ibid., p. 12. 15 Cf. Hägerström, “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” p. 80. 16 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 1-42;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 56-105;“Är gällande rätt?,” pp. 82-89; “Is Positive Law?,” pp. 41-48. 1. 2 f ict ions and the dete rminat ion of the law: the wi ll-theory in i ts di f fe rent gui se s 1. 2 . 1 the monarch’s wi ll in the monarchical state
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