stellungen: Hägerström, the apparently clear-cut distinction between epistemology, other areas of philosophy, and specific scientific knowledge that Hägerström outlined in Filosofiskt lexikon, becomes blurred as soon they are related to ontology and logic.3 Furthermore, in Selbstdarstellungen Hägerström explicitly designated the target of his philosophical investigations as the metaphysical influence manifest in contemporary philosophy and science.4 If one keeps in mind Hägerström’s characterization of metaphysics, as the art of expressing nonsense,5 then the positive objective of Hägerström’s scientific work can be defined e contrario, as being an attempt to secure the objectivity of scientific knowledge in contrast to the inherent subjectivity of metaphysical socalled knowledge.6 A question that immediately comes to mind is this: If the characterization of metaphysics as the art or science of expressing nonsense is correct, must one not then assume that science and metaphysics are the antitheses of one another? The following investigation will reveal whether or not that is the case (See also Part VII). A leading principle of Hägerström’s philosophy is its manifest Kantian influences. In Filosofiskt lexikon Hägerström wrote that he, inDas Prinzip derWissenschaft (1908) and Botanisten och filosofen(1910), had used Kant’s philosophy as both a positive and a negative point of departure, and that he in these books had maintained, but not carried through, certain basic epistemological ideas.7 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 37 1. 1 kant ian inf luence s , negat ive and pos i t ive 3 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, passim. 4 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.”; Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 26-48. 5 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, p. 26. 6 Cf. Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.”; Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 26-48. 7 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.”
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