From a scientific point of view, the problem of such fantasies is that taken by themselves they need not be logically inconsistent, but that any attempt to determine their correspondence with objective reality necessitates the inclusion of contradictions into the deductive system, which suspends the determinations of physical reality itself. In one context, Hägerström discusses a few traditional legal concepts, such as property law, and their traditional explanation in legal theory,217 only to dismiss these concepts and explanations as expressions of natural law and other forms of legal metaphysics. The reason for their dismissal is Hägerström’s postulate that the basis of traditional legal concepts involves a notion involving that rights and correlative duties can be created regardless of whether or not a legal order exists, an absurdity according to Hägerström, as even natural law is a legal order, albeit metaphysical. What must be stressed is that Hägerström’s rejection of natural law’s conception of rights is conducted on the basis of his observation that the legal position of occupation is what natural law considers to be an institutive fact of law prior to all other property rights, and creating rights and duties irrespective of the existence of a legal order, is an idea whose realization presupposes the existence of a real legal order.When Hägerström analyzed the non-existent legal base for propositions that certain legal concepts had reality parallel to the positive legal order, he used concepts such as “an existing legal order” as verifying facts. If we look at the example occupatio, an example taken from natural law, this concept is supposed to explain original ownership, but it is quite clear that occupatio cannot alone, and construed as a force raised above the legal order, uphold ownership. In fact, in order for the notion of ownership based uponoccupatioto have any legal meana ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 359 3. 7. 2 the rights of prope rty, things , and pos se s s ion as natural rights 217 Ibid., pp. 36-78; Hägerström, “Förhållandet mellan staten och rätten (1924),” pp. 247-250.
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