theories of natural law, and its non-empirical methods of verification, then his reasons for dismissing the doctrines of traditional jurisprudence become all the more obvious.214 Hägerström’s line of argument is the following: if, for example, an idea of rights is to be verified by facts, then it is natural to assume that this verification can be conducted by means of the customary conditions for verification, namely correspondence between theory and fact. However, this is where natural law goes astray, because the corresponding fact to natural law is “… the supposed supernatural power or obligation” which as a category “… is a logical absurdity. It is held to refer to a reality which is elevated above the physical world.Yet, on the other hand, every ‘right’ is supposed to have as its object an advantage which belongs to the physical world, and every ‘duty’ is supposed to have as its object a certain way of acting in that world.”215 What is illogical in natural law theory is that its method of verification makes the traditional methods of validation impossible, as it severs every connection to sensible reality, while simultaneously making verification a function of the same reality. Furthermore, what is illogical and absurd to Hägerström, is that natural law theory makes reference to a super-sensible context of reality, while the “reality” in this specific context cannot refer to anything other than empirical reality, existence, hence the relationship between proposition and fact, and the definition of truth, namely correspondence, is indeterminate, which in turn makes any conclusion thus arrived at unscientific.To be blunt, what natural law theory provides for jurisprudence are fictions, fantasies, and humbug.216 What is real according to natural law is subjective reality, but not reality in the strict sense of the word (objective external reality). p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 358 214 See, e.g., Hägerström,“Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” pp. 36-43;“Naturrätt?,”passim. 215 Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 128-129;“Declaration of Intention,” p. 324. Swedish: “… den tänkta övernaturliga makten, resp. bundenheten är en logisk absurditet. Den skall hänföra sig på en över den naturliga världen höjd verklighet. Men ändock skall varje ‘rättighet’, resp.‘plikt’ ha till objekt en till den naturliga världen hörande fördel, resp. ett därtill hörande handlingssätt.” 216 Hägerström, “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” p. 67.
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