claims that eternally true propositions of law, rights, and duties exist irrespective of whether or not positive facts corroborate the proposition or not, or irrespective of whether these rights and duties can be realized by means of an objectively existing power of enforcement.209 Despite this manifest disharmony between ideal lawandreal law, natural law theory claims to give a valid account of legal reality as it is per se. It is by means of this contention that the illogical, unreal, and metaphysical enters into the system of legal science, but: “… since the super-sensible cannot be conceived alongside the sensible, every such idea is false.”210 To conclude, Hägerström defines natural law and similar conceptions of law as being theories that assume that, independently of, and parallel to, positive law there both may, and do, exist binding legal obligations among the individuals of a society.211 What Hägerström wished to demonstrate was the logical problems and inconsistencies of the traditional determinations and explanations of rights and duties.212 These problems originated from the theories’ lack of factual basis as well as their mystical foundations.213 To any student of Hägerström’s works this line of argumentation, and the subsequent corollary judgments - illogical, unreal, metaphysical, natural law, and unscientific - is familiar. In his analyses of law and fundamental legal concepts, these terms surface repeatedly. If one considers that the specific type of ideas to which Hägerström refers all have their origins in the a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 357 3. 7. 1 the ideas of rights and dut i e s - log ical incons i stenci e s and insuf f ici ent corre spondence betwe en legal theory and the facts of law 209 Hägerström, “Naturrätt?,” p. 321. 210 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 211 Cf. Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 166; “The Notion of Law,” p. 254; “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 86-87. 212 Hägerström, “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” pp. 36-78, 115-118. 213 Hägerström, Obligationsbegriff 1, pp. 6 and 9-10.
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