of rules for the so-called organs of the state - themselves defined in the rules - a system of rules which is actually carried through. The idea of rights in another sense than the advantages which the individual is granted through the system of rules, is an idea of super-sensible powers.”202 Hence, not only practitioners, but also the legal scientist, must act realistically and too adhere to positive law.This view becomes all the more clear when one contemplates Hägerström’s general view of legal science as a practice endowed with the task of formulating general principles of positive law. If it is the case that legal science either, or both, disregards the positive material governing it, and mixes positivism and metaphysics, then one understands that the main scope of the Uppsala School’s legal criticism must be aimed at legal science, not at law as such. This distinction between the study of law as such and legal science is one that has not been properly addressed in the contemporary discussion on the Uppsala School. If legal science failed to make positive law its object, or failed to reject metaphysics and fictions, then it would in turn fail to achieve its task of creating an internally coherent real world of scientific concepts. For neither the real legal order, nor the metaphysical order, can be understood as being real at the same time without having an indefinite relationship towards one another, hence a doctrine based upon deductive inferences from a non-positive material consisting of reifications and fictions cannot provide scientific truths. It therefore cannot be used as a valid source of law, as its conclusions would lack logical validity and as a consequence there of lack scientific authority, which combined, would undermine the normative authority of doctrine as a source of law, whereby it would cease to be binding for the lawyers. The parallel that Hägerström drew between the partial deductivity of natural sciences and that of jurisprudence does not, however, imply that he covertly adhered to the formalistic view p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 354 202 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.”
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