tion of the principles of rational law, which in turn appears to include the determination of the real rights belonging to individuals.171 In other words, that natural law is determined by means of a transcendent analysis of positive law172 - a return in spirit, for example, to the natural law theory of ChristianWolff. The second view, Rudolf von Jhering’s, rejects natural law by redefining the rights of positive law into authoritative declarations of legally protected interests, which are realized through the exercise of power carried out by the legal order.173 Apart from the natural inconsistencies of Jehring’s theory it can easily, without any fundamental changes of the original definition of laws and rights, be transformed into a functioning theory.Therefore, when redefining Jhering’s theory of rights in a direction that may turn into a functioning theory,Hägerström does so with the other theories of rights and laws as authoritative declarations (especially the naturalistic theory) kept in mind. Hägerström’s functioning theory requires the following understanding of law: Any declaration of right on the part of the legislator, does thus not entail that that specific right really is protected, which would necessitate that judges and relevant authorities act according to the rules of law.What is expressed is that through law a certain interest shall be protected by the relevant authorities, but not that this interest actually is protected.174 Taken together, Hägerström’s description of the different declarative theories expresses the fundamental indifference of jurists to meta-legal issues such as, for example, the intrinsic truth p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 346 171 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 172 N. B.The term “real” is a term that Hägerström attaches great importance to in his analysis of the idea that positive law is made up of authoritative prescriptions of the rights and duties of each person, for what Hägerström opposes is the idea that these rights and duties can be real in the manner defined by natural and rational law, that is as if theses rights and duties where objectively real (in the metaphysical sense of the world, that is, ontologically autonomous in relationship to positive law), in contrast to being merely existing, that is, merely real on account of what is ordained by positive law. 173 Hägerström, “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” pp. 81-82. 174 Ibid., p. 82.
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