non-normative,167 since sociological and psychological observations can neither, nor will, help determine the meaning and content of a norm.168 There exist two different views relating to the relationship between law and rights, both of which experiment with the idea that the legal propositions constitute authoritative declarations of rights and duties.The first does so without rejecting natural law, while the second rejects natural law. The first view reserves the determination of what natural law contains and prescribes (including the subsequent transformation of natural law into positive law) to the law-making, legislative authorities.169 Irrespective of inherent scientific inadequacies, this view expresses the prevailing views on how lawyers in general work as well as how they understand the object law, namely as a system of rules of conduct and competence whose implementation and application is unaffected by the ontological autonomy and intrinsic truth value of the rules of law themselves. Hägerström concludes that the rules of law in general are to be understood as being authoritative determinations of real rights and duties, whereby legal science becomes an investigation of real rights and duties (as they are expressed in the rules of law), and positive law (the realization of natural law) is thus reduced to a dogmatic exercise of rights and duties, which jurisprudence in turn systematize.170 This compromise between natural law and legal positivism is to be found in the works of Otto von Gierke, H. Krabbe, E. Hölder, W. Schuppe, R. Stammler, and G. Jellinek who all understand the object of the science of positive law to comprise the determinaa ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 345 167 SeeWedberg,“Some Problems in the Logical Analysis of Legal Science,”Theoria 17 (1951): pp. 252-261. See also Hedenius, Om rätt och moral, pp. 58, for his distinction between “äkta och oäkta rättssatser” (“genuine and false legal norms”), which has a similar effect on the legal analysis; Ross, Om ret og retfærdighed: en indførelse i den analytiske retsfilosofi, pp. 41-47 and 66-73. 168 Cf. Hägerström, “Är gällande rätt?,” p. 75; “Is Positive Law?,” p. 17. 169 Hägerström, “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” p. 80. 170 Ibid.
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