law, a conception that in turn has been adopted by the so-called consciousness of law, but simultaneously the organs of state do not consider themselves to be bound by the inexact and indeterminate principles of what is called natural or rational law, which is what they would have considered themselves to have been bound by if the theory was correct.161 Hägerström’s argument is that if one adds a will-theoretical idea of law to the aforementioned manner of expression, then the validity of the legal propositions are conditioned by the intentional content of the law-making will itself.162 However, since no will on its own can make a proposition true, this specific law-making will is nonexistent.There exist no absolute rights and duties and the idea of the will-theory, that legal propositions can prescribe objectively existing rights and duties, lacks real merit.163 However, in all likelihood the citizens in question actually believe that their rights and duties are conditioned by the will of the legislator, which provides the will-theory with sensible meaning.164 Incidentally, according to Hägerström, this is the will-theory’s only worthwhile contribution to the science of law,165 but this alone neither mends the scientific flaws of the will-theory, nor makes its explanation of the origin of rights and duties any more tenable. From a practical point of view, what is even more damning is that the will-theory’s sole contribution to legal science is made up of sociological and psychological observations rather than legal observations.166 To be more specific, from a legal point of view sociological and psychological observations in principle lack legal relevance and validity, and hence, to use the words of Anders Wedberg (1913-1978), they are external and p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 344 161 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 162 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” pp. 113-115; “Declaration of Intention,” pp. 312-315. 163 See, e.g., Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 162-168; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 250-256. 164 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 164; “The Notion of Law,” p. 252. 165 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 165; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 253-254. 166 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 51-60 and 162-168;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 116-126 and 250-256.
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