InOn the Question of the Notion of Law(1917), Hägerström touches upon the subject of whether the law, as an expression of the legislative will, can prescribe the individual rights and duties of a person in an authoritative manner, as is commonly postulated by legal theory.158 On account of the will-theoretical origins of this notion of rights and duties (which he dealt with in “Är gällande rätt uttryck av vilja?”[1916] -“Is Positive Law an Expression of Will?” [1953]159) Hägerström rejects this theory of rights and duties. It is undeniably so that legal propositions are presented as if they actually are authoritative, objectively binding statements regarding the existence of rights and duties - which incidentally, is the manner in which the law-making authorities, legal subjects, and legal science in general understand how legal propositions enter into existence and function.160 This explanation of the nature of rights and duties is meaningless, especially when viewed from the perspective of the law-making organs.The idea itself originates from the conception of the legal order provided by natural a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 343 3. 5. 1 re s idual natural law theory in pos i t ivi sm 3.5 [2] Rejecting the Corollary to the Will-theory: Positive Law is not: “… an authoritative prescription of each person’s rights and duties.”157 157 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 158 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 122-126;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 201206. 159 Hägerström, “Gällande rätt?.”; “Is Positive Law?.” 160 Hägerström, “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” p. 79.
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