law, and the definition of law provided by Classical natural law is manifest, as is the muddled distinctions between law and politics, especially if one takes into account that Classical natural law in effect understands real law (in the metaphysical sense of the word) as an object signified, not by its actuality (existence) in the form of enforced positive law, but by its general potentiality, its ideal reality, and formal perfection. In fact, natural law implies that positive law is the privation of (real) law. In other words, according to Classical natural law, real law is an ideal. For in each case only the idea of law is real, not law itself. No small wonder that Hägerström’s critique is harsh and unforgiving. p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 342
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