RB 65

to claim that the rule of law prevails as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of ideology. For it is only in truly despotic states that there exists no law, and brute, unbridled force takes its place. Even if it is commonplace to accuse Hägerström and the Uppsala School for concurring with the adage that “might is right”,147 any one superficially acquainted with history knows that this traditional maxim can be traced back further back in history than to the first half of the 20th Century.148 In his analysis of power, Hägerström suspects that it is from an analysis of the mechanisms of despotism and despotic states that sociological jurisprudence collected its real influences. For a truly legal analysis of the working mechanisms of the legal order would not arrive at a formulation of a universal principle predicating that the sovereign is unbound by law. Legal theory also provides the law-making will with a formal definition.150 According to the formal definition, the law-making p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 340 147 Sigurdson, Den lyckliga filosofin: etik och politik hos Hägerström,Tingsten, makarna Myrdal och Hedenius, pp. 71-72; Sundberg, The Swedish Philosopher Axel Haegerstroem and his Relationship to Finland’s Struggle to Preserve her Legal Order, 1899-1917, pp. v-vii and 60-64 (On Hägerström’s failure to provide a theory of law in support for inter alia the Finnish struggle for liberty and law); fr. Eddan, pp. 264-271 (Hägerström’s connection to socialistic oppression); Strzelewicz, De mänskliga rättigheternas historia: från den amerikanska oavhängighetsförklaringen till våra dagar, pp. 201-208 et passim (On positivism and its supposedly destructive effects for the concept of human rights). 148 E.g.,Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (5th Century BC), see Russell, History, pp. 95 and 132-134. See also Rüthers, Rechtstheorie: Begriff, Geltung und Anwendung des Rechts, p. 241. 149 Hägerström, “Är gällande rätt?,” pp. 76-77; “Is Positive Law?,” p. 35. Swe: “Dock är det just den rena despotien, som tjänar den här behandlade teorien [sociologisk rättspositivism] som förebild. Särskilt har den framkallats av den (med fakta icke fullt adekvata) idéen om den romerske kejsaren såsom ‘princeps legibus solutus’. Man har [felaktigt] antagit, att all rätt måste vila på en sådan rättsligt [sett] obunden makt.” (contents of square brackets added here). Cf. Olivecrona, Rättsordningen, pp. 44-49 and 93-98.Who concludes that Austin’s theory of law is a theory of English law. “Yet it is pure despotism which serves as a model for the theory [of sociological jurisprudence] under discussion. In particular it has been occasioned by the idea (which is not adequately supported by facts) of the Roman emperor as ‘princeps legibus solutus.’ It has been assumed [wrongly] that all law must rest upon such a power not subject to any law.”149

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