and subsequent absurdities. Moreover, it is finally on the basis of his analysis of the imperative-theory that Hägerström discredits the entire will-theory (including the declarative theory), which he describes as the theory occupying itself with:“the empty fantasy of a commanding and prohibiting legal order.”121 And if one compares this judgment with Hägerström’s ontology and epistemology, then one cannot help but observe that a positivistic theory of law - the imperative-theory - is discarded and rejected on similar grounds as he would have rejected any admittedly metaphysical theory of law, such as classical natural law.122 The will-theory suffers from several inconsistencies and problems that helped Hägerström to reveal its falsehood. An often occurring idea in modern legal theory is that law actually exists in the form of the expressed intents and wishes of a certain authoritative will that is active in society.123 If one examines the substratum to the will-theory, it becomes evident that this explanation of the genesis and true nature of law is a mere simile providing no actual or additional information of the real content of law and jurisprudence.What the will-theory at best provides is an explanation of how law is brought into action through human activities motivated by the human will. However, to jurisprudence the real interest and task lies in its determination of the system of law itself, not the issue of whether or not the system has been brought about by human acts of will,124 as the latter in no way helps to clarify the meaning of law. p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 330 3. 4 . 1 ci rcular de f ini t ions and unnece s sary hypothe se s in the non-metaphys ical explanat ions of the law-making wi ll 121 Ibid. My translation. Swedish: “den intiga fantasiföreställningen om en befallande och förbjudande rättsordning.” 122 See, e.g., Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 15;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 72-73; “Stat och statsformer (1921),” in Rätten och staten: tre föreläsningar om rätts- och statsfilosofi, pp. 167, 190; “Förhållandet mellan staten och rätten (1924),” p. 239. 123 Hägerström, “Är gällande rätt?,” p. 59; “Is Positive Law?,” p. 17 124 Hägerström, “Är gällande rätt?,” p. 60; “Is Positive Law?,” p. 18.
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