stronger natural connection than otherwise.110 The primary distinction between the two different theories is that natural law theory accepts that there exist legal norms that are neither instituted nor acknowledged by an earthly power, and that these norms, on account of their intrinsic qualities, nevertheless constitute valid norms, while legal positivism argues that the category of valid law must be traceable to reality and real facts for validation, a specific time and place, as well as be attributed to a specific earthly power.111 The main emphasis of Hägerström’s efforts was laid on his critique of the positivistic will-theory. The reason for this allocation of efforts is probably that the critique directed at the positivistic version of will-theory affects voluntarism in natural law and legal positivism alike,112 and that the critique of legal positivism has greater relevance for the understanding of modern law than the critique directed against a legal theory abandoned for more than a hundred years, and, finally, that the philosophical problems connected to the will-theory present themselves with more clarity if the critique is leveled against a theory of law that itself rejects metaphysics. For instance, according to Hägerström, natural law on the one hand contends that legal obligations bind men irrespective of facts. Positive law prescribes, on the other hand, that there is an obligation to subject oneself to positive law; because, ultimately the binding power of positive law comes from something other than itself.113 In other words, according to Hägerström’s definition of natural law its obligations, and the correlative, rights, bind natural legal subjects on account p a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 326 110 Hägerström, Magistratische Ius, pp. 2-3. 111 Olivecrona, Rättsordningen, pp. 22, 36, and 39. 112 Hägerström, “Förhållandet mellan staten och rätten (1924),” in Rätten och staten: tre föreläsningar om rätts- och statsfilosofi, pp. 261-262. 113 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 166-167;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 254-256. 3. 3 phi losophical reasons for the cri t ique of legal pos i t ivi sm
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