The will-theory of law is invalid and unsubstantiated, hence positive law cannot consist of a declaration of will from the side of the state.Through a series of historical analyses of different legal systems (Greek, Roman, Germanic, and English), coupled to an analysis of modern statute application, Hägerström illustrates the fundamental problems by which the will-theory is troubled, which also results in his demonstration of the will-theory’s lack of scientific validity.101 Moreover, Hägerström’s intention was to prove that both the will-theory of natural law and the modern, positivistic, will-theory contained traces of natural law, and inevitably invalidated the entire idea of law as declaration of will.102 Nevertheless, what must be kept in mind is what Hägerström criticizes when he analyzes positivism. His critique is not leveled against the fundamental idea of legal positivism, namely that law is a human artifact, a phenomenon belonging to an empirical context, and an object characterized by its spatio-temporal limitations.103 In fact, Hägerström ascribes to this idea, which is demonstrated by the fact that he defines the scientific study of law as the study of positive law,104 which is the study of an empip a r t v, c h a p t e r 3 324 3. 1 [1] cri t ique of legal sci ence and the wi ll-theory of law: “pos i t ive law i s not a declarat ion of wi ll from the s ide of the state”100 100 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 101 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, p. 1 and 16; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 56 and 74-75; Das magistratische Ius in seinem Zusammenhang mit dem römischen Sakralrechte, pp. 2-3. 102 See, e.g., Hägerström,“Är gällande rätt?,” p. 89 and 94;“Is Positive Law?,” pp. 48-49 and 53-54; Obligationsbegriff 1, pp. 17-18; “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” pp. 80-81. 103 See also PartVI, Chapter 8 (Which is based on Lyles,“Scire leges non hoc est, verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem,” in Perspectives on Jurisprudence: Essays in Honor of Jes Bjarup). However, cf., e.g., Bjarup, “Axel Hägerströms filosofi, värdenihilism och rättspositivism,”passim. Bjarup interprets Hägerström’s theory as one primarily occupied with: the advancement of Hägerström’s own metaphysics; the expression of Hägerström’s scientific and ideological delusions of grandeur; and the rejection of non-metaphysical legal science such as legal positivism. It is, however, incomprehensible how Bjarup manages to conclude that Hägerström is a metaphysican. 104 See, e.g., Hägerström,“Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99;“Declaration of Intention,” p. 299.
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