non-cognitivism precludes the necessity of determining the truth value of that which one cannot know - the values themselves. In turn, the non-cognitivistic basis for Hägerström’s value theory affects his theory of law. As will be demonstrated, his theory of law is primarily concerned with dismantling the prevailing theories of the law of his time; theories that irrespective of their own positivistic theoretical programs still contained elements of metaphysics, or what Hägerström would call natural law, elements that according to Hägerström are essentially nothing more than moral evaluations and value-judgments that respectively under no conditions are elements that can sustain an objectively tenable theory of law.90 Hägerström held the opinion that the study of law constituted a special branch of science that had come to distance itself from philosophy. Historically, legal science had been closely affiliated with rational law (which used to be understood as the necessary precondition for the proper understanding of positive law). According to the modern conception of legal science, the function of the science of law had changed, and now the task of legal science, by analogy with natural sciences, was reduced: “… merely to establish the facts within a certain region, to reach general principles by induction, and to make deductive inferences from the inductively established results.”91 Thus, legal science must - just as with the natural sciences - avoid venturing into the realms of transcendent philosophical speculation, and keep to hard facts.To Hägerström, the overriding problem was not the speculative evaluative approach of rational law, but the fact that the concepts that were supposed to determine facts within the area of law and legal science, on account of inherent contradictions, were “… notions only in appearance”, and hence the facts that were supposed to correspond to the concepts were not real p a r t v, c h a p t e r 2 320 90 See Part IV. 91 Hägerström, “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. Swedish: “…blott att på visst område konstatera fakta, genom induktion vinna allmänna satser och ur de induktivt vunna resultaten göra deduktioner.”
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