false.”85 When analyzing law, Hägerström ventures even further and argues that positive law is neither to be identified with the content of the will of the state - that is, the content of an authoritative declaration of rights and duties - nor with those ideas about justice expressed by the so-called general “consciousness of law”.86 Finally, he contends that both legal philosophy and legal science contain confused ideas, not only with regard to state and statehood, but also in relation to the state’s power to create objectively existing rights and duties.87 This confusion in legal theory is inherent in contemporary jurisprudence, and its origins can be traced back to what in the end amounts to an uncritical acceptance of traditional ideas of law. These ideas involve the ontology of law (namely law as a factor not only giving, but also maintaining objectively [ever]lasting rights and duties); the genesis of law (as that of actual powers derived or emanating from magic and magical powers); and finally, a contradiction in contemporary jurisprudence (expressing itself in its tendency to maintain the positive character of law, while simultaneously maintaining a super-sensible notion of law - in other words, modern jurisprudence’s non-positive understanding of law).88 In short, Hägerström judged contemporary jurisprudence to be governed by a contradictory predilection to deny anything but sensible reality (positive law), while simultaneously accepting a supernatural legal reality (natural law). It is thus not entirely surprising that contemporary jurisprudence could neither satisfy Hägerström’s exacting scientific demands nor deliver non-contradictory and consistent conclusions about the content and nature of positive as well as natural law.The issue at hand seems to p a r t v, c h a p t e r 2 318 85 Hägerström, “Hägerström,” p. 91; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström,” p. 316. Swedish:“Idéen om rättigheter i annan mening än de fördelar, som den enskilde erhåller genom regelsystemet, är en idé om översinnliga krafter. Och då det översinnliga ej utan motsägelse låter sig tänkas jämte det sinnliga, är varje sådan idé falsk.” 86 Hägerström,“Hägerström,” pp. 91-92;“The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström,” p. 316. Swedish: “rättsmedvetandet”. 87 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 46-48. 88 Ibid., p. 47.
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