halting relationship between the theory of natural law and legal reality, as a relationship where pure reason, in the form of ideal law, is distanced from reality, real law, and thus indeterminate in relation to positive law materially as well as formally, leaving the application of law without any practical guidance.Therefore, for the natural law theory, the problem is that its determination of reason, as to the cause of the law of reason and natural law, leaves the category of law empty and void of a concrete reality through which practical reason can express itself, whereby the law of reason ceases to have any normative content.28 What is even more interesting is that what makes positive law applicable to human affairs and legally authoritative - the ability of positive law to adapt its content to historical circumstances and human affairs and needs - is the element that according to natural law disqualifies positive law as an object of philosophical analysis.29 What is vital for the philosophical analysis of law is not the practical applicability and practical validity of the normative principles so much as their intrinsic validity and universality.30 This in turn widens the gap between legal philosophy, rational law, and natural law from positive jurisprudence and legal practice, thereby making the transcendent study of law, legal philosophy, dispensable to legal practice in contrast to the dogmatic study of law, which on the contrary is practical by nature and bound to an applicative analysis of positive law, and has its ability to deliver solutions to practical problems as its second truth criterion, in addition to its formal validity.31 Unfortunately, natural law theory spills over from the study of private law into all other fields of law, especially public law, which openly borrows concepts and doctrines from private law, especially from the law of obligations, and uses them to explain the right of the state to exert power a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 301 28 Ibid., pp. 145-146. 29 Ibid., pp. 147-148. 30 Ibid., pp. 148-150. 31 See ibid., pp. viii-ix, and 1-32.
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