of positive law.23 In particular, the doctrines of natural law, and adjacent perspectives on positive law, express themselves in issues such as the state’s right to punish criminal behavior - that is, issues of meta-law.24 What is of particular interest, from a strictly critical point of view, is whether or not the principles of natural law really bind the legislator; for instance, whether or not the scientific study of penal law is infused with legal metaphysics: Or as Hägerström writes in another article, where he discusses the juridical justification of an existing penal rule, and refers to the legislative committee (Swedish: lagutskottet) that dealt with the issue of justification of penal rules of law as if there existed a superior law restricting the legislator’s authority to penalize unwanted behavior.26 Therefore, what is of interest is a theory of law that contradicts facts, but nevertheless is held to be true and valid, which according to Hägerström is the hallmark of metaphysics in law.This is the exact type of jurisprudence whose claims for practical validity and applicability are held to be tenuous.27 Even more characteristic of Hägerström’s analysis and critique of natural law is his conclusion that it lacks all those characteristics necessary for it to be, or become, a valid source of law. Quite early in his career, Hägerström (Stat och rätt, 1904) described the p a r t v, c h a p t e r 1 300 “However, the issue is not only: whether penal jurisprudence deals directly with concepts of natural law?, but also: is it indirectly dependent upon natural law, insofar as the world of concepts of natural law is understood to be actually determinative for penal law, even though it is not.”25 23 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 166-168;“The Notion of Law,” pp. 254-256. 24 Cf. Hägerström, “Naturrätt?,” p. 324. 25 Ibid. My translation. Swedish:“Här blir emellertid frågan ej blott den: rör sig straffrättsvetenskapen direkt med naturrättsliga begrepp?, utan även den: är den indirekt beroende av naturrätten, såtillvida, att dess begreppsvärld behandlas somfaktiskt bestämmande för straffrätten, även om den ej är det?” 26 Hägerström, “Svikligt förtigande,” p. 314. 27 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 10 and 29.
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