Natural law theory advances the idea that law has two forms of expression, one natural and the other supernatural14- positive law and so-called natural law. In relation to each other, natural law is prior as well as superior to positive law,15 and in fact the very substance of law.16 Further characteristics of natural law are these: its self-professed autonomy vis-à-vis positive law, which it even claims to determine;17 its claim of an ideal, but never realized validity,18 even in stark contrast to social as well as legal reality;19 and finally, its lack of concretization and content.20 All in all natural law is:“… merely abstractly conceived, but unrealized law.”21 Or as jurists would say: natural law is lex ferenda, but not lex lata. Natural law is thus the idea of a system composed of intrinsically valid norms that have ideal validity and applicability to human affairs, which ultimately ought to bring about the direct and real validity of these norms and their applicability to human affairs.22 In addition, the natural norms are held to be valid irrespective a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 299 1. 3 an introductory de f ini t ion of natural law: “… natural law, i . e. me re ly abstractly conce ived, but unreal i z ed law”13 13 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, p. 248. My translation. Swedish: “… naturrätt, d.v.s. endast in abstracto tänkt, icke realiserad rätt.” 14 Hägerström, “Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning av grunden för ett löftes juridiskt bindande kraft, belyst genom å ena sidan romersk, å andra sidan naturrättslig rättsåskådning,” in Minnesskrift ägnad 1734 års lag, p. 574; Recht, Pflicht und bindende Kraft des Vertrages: nach Römischer und Naturrechtlicher Anschauung, ed. Olivecrona, p. 14. 15 Cf. Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 202-220 and 248. 16 Hägerström,“Nehrman-Ehrenstråles uppfattning,” pp. 595-596; Recht, Pflicht etc, pp. 41-43. 17 Hägerström, “Svikligt förtigande,” p. 314. 18 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. viii-ix, 248. 19 Hägerström,“Naturrätt i straffrättsvetenskapen?,”Svensk Juristtidning (SvJT) 5 (1920): pp. 321-322. 20 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, pp. 144-147; “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 86-87; “Rättsidéers uppkomst (1917),” in Rätten och staten: tre föreläsningar om rätts- och statsfilosofi, pp. 79-80. 21 Hägerström, Stat och rätt, p. 248. My translation. Swedish: “… endast in abstracto tänkt, icke realiserad rätt.” 22 Hägerström, “Naturrätt?,” pp. 321-322; “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299.
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