invariably must subject itself to positive facts. For while rational jurisprudence constitutes a science bound only by formal strictures, positivistic jurisprudence constitutes a science bound by the rules of positive law.This involves the valid determination of the general scope of application of these rules (principles as well as concepts determined through induction), the systemic applicability of these principles of positive or valid law, and finally the valid determination of any coercive measures that may be applied, that is, that are legal with respect to the aforementioned rules, principles, and concepts.12 Such a definition of the jurisprudential mandate necessarily implies that the extent and range of positivistic jurisprudence with respect to other legal discourses is less than what rationalistic jurisprudence believed it to be. Finally, since legal concepts (which themselves are general principles of the aforementioned kind established synthetically or analytically) according to the tenets of positivism must have their material basis in the rules of positive law, then these concepts as a rule only have the authority to structure, classify, and systematize (new) rules of law (including legislation, case law, and customary law). In other words, the legal concepts only retain the principal authority of designating under what concept a (new) rule of law, legal relation, or case falls. In his attempt to reconnect the severed link between philosophy and jurisprudence Hägerström chose to approach jurisprudence by the way of a Socratic frame of mind, and allowed philosophy to act critically, and investigate the material doctrines of jurisprudence by investigating the inductive method that positivistic jurisprudence (an object-oriented science) ought to apply from a formal point of view, rather than letting philosophy a priori prescribe what material doctrines positivistic jurisprudence ought to contain. Finally, he allowed philosophy to investigate the effects the scientific dogmatism of natural law have on the principles of jurisprudence. p a r t v, c h a p t e r 1 298 12 Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 62-63.
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