from the domain of legal science to the domain of legal politics. A purely positivistic approach to the sources of law and that which can be inferred from them,must be chosen in preference to alternative theories and methods. Furthermore, Hägerström’s choice of words in this regard definitely indicates his basic choice of legal methodology, namely traditional legal dogmatics as far as it does not transcend that which is laid down in, and possible to infer from, the sources of positive law.9 Finally, the main question regarding Hägerström’s critique must therefore be whether or not legal positivism really followed its own scientific program.10 Since the phenomena that positivistic jurisprudence deals with are facts, they must be dealt with on the basis of a method adapted to the object in question, which is induction.This is the only method that allows the cognitive subject, on the basis of particular instances, to establish relatively universal principles.11 From a purely philosophical perspective, two questions have to be considered:What is the nature of the facts with which jurisprudence must concern itself? To what extent do the results of the induction (and the ensuing deduction) have the authority to lay down the law in discourses outside that of dogmatic jurisprudence? One could rephrase these questions:Within which ranges may positivistic jurisprudence roam?What authority does jurisprudence have to make law? This is a problem that rationalistic jurisprudence, natural law, does not have to concern itself with, since it is not restricted to historical facts for the validity of its conclusions in the same manner as positivistic jurisprudence a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 297 1. 2 de f ini t ion of the range and scope of juri sprudence 9 Note that Hägerström speaks of jurisprudence as an inductive and deductive science, hence jurisprudence must by definition adhere to positive law at all times, both when synthesizing a system of law and when subsuming cases under superior principles and rules of law. 10 E.g., Hägerström, Der römische Obligationsbegriff im Lichte der allgemeinen römischen Rechtsanschauung, vol. 1, pp. 1, 5-6 and 17-18. 11 See Part II.
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