The ontology and epistemology of values in Hägerström’s metaethical theory limits the reach and object of the science of ethics, from a normative a priori to a normative a posteriori, hence the science of ethics is reduced to investigating the positive norms of a society or population. The essence of Hägerström’s meta-ethical theory is that in the scientific investigation of morals and ethics (and law) the question regarding the relationship between, on the one hand, the theoretical dismissal of values and on the other, the practical importance of values, must be separated from one another. Hägerström argues that this separation must be maintained in order to avoid the confusion of epistemology and ontology prevalent in subjectivism, as well as avoiding the subsequent confusion of the epistemology and ontology of morals in the ethical theories of subjectivistic origin, which are usually theories of morals assigned to the tradition of so-called value objectivism. Hägerström elaborates this argumentation by asking questions directed at the heart of value-objectivism: Do the feelings of disapproval directed towards an action disappear once the cause of the feeling of disapproval is revealed not to constitute an objective property of that action?Will feelings of disapproval towards an action subside and disappear once the cause of the feelings is revealed to be only one of an emotive, and thus of a purely subjective nature, rather than one of an objective nature?128 The anp a r t i v 286 Limitation of the reach of any ethical science chap te r 5 128 Hägerström, Selbstdarstellungen, pp. 45-46.
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