the law in force - to be more specific, the legal corollary of a specific rule of law.According to the internal view, the rule’s material content is a priori a rule to be followed, not a proposition a posteriori. Hägerström’s view is that jurisprudence produces doctrines and concepts on the basis of positive law, doctrines and concepts that therefore must be synthetic propositions, not analytical propositions,125 which in turn implies that a sharp distinction is made between learned legal opinions de lege lata and de lege ferenda.And as far as the practitioner is concerned, his job is still to work within the field of de lege lata, for according to him the law is “true”a priori and should therefore be obeyed and applied. Both groups of lawyers, regardless of role, must therefore be legal positivists; the practitioner out of practical necessity and the academic lawyer primarily out of scientific demands, as these demands are defined by epistemology in general and legal science in particular, and secondarily out of pragmatic considerations as the jurisprudents’ findings and conclusions are only adducible as principles of law provided that they correspond to positive law.126 Any finding de lege ferenda, however, is still possible to propose, but it is in neither case a finding of positive law, merely an argument de lege ferenda. If the lawyers, however, wish to alter the content of material law they must do so in accordance with the rules and methods of positive law - through legislation, altered practices and customs, altered precedents, deductions, analogies or justice.127 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 285 125 See Part VLegal Science. 126 Cf. Hägerström, “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 85-91. 127 Hägerström, “Om svikligt förtigande såsom straffbart efter 22:1 SL.,”Svensk Juristtidning (SvJT) 24 (1939): p. 334; “Begreppet viljeförklaring,” p. 99; “Declaration of Intention,” p. 299. For a discussion (mainly directed at “sterile Kelsenian formalism”) about how positive law is usually applied and supplemented see, e.g., Hägerström, “Hans Kelsen: Allgemeine Staatslehre,” review of Hans Kelsen: Allgemeine Staatslehre, Litteris: an international critical review of the humanities 5 (1928): pp. 20-22 and3637; “Begreppet gällande rätt,” pp. 69-70 and 75. See also Parts V andVI.
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