fic objectivity of values and valuations, and hence no absolute proof of their absolutivity.The universal acceptance of a common set of values only shows intersubjectivity, which is not the same as objectivity.124 For while intersubjectivity is subject-dependent, objectivity is subject-independent.The intersubjectivity of moral values and so on only provides us with the inductive ground for establishing a fact (for example, that this group of persons share a common set of values) or for making a prediction about hitherto unobserved cases. Intersubjectivity will not provide evidence for the establishment of a universal moral norm. In this case, induction will only provide us with the material for making the prediction, with a degree of probability relative to supporting evidence that the next observed moral subject will probably share moral values and valuations with those adhered to by the previously observed group of moral subjects.The tentative fact that everybody shares a set of values can consequently not constitute evidence for the conclusion that this set of values is eternally and universally valid. The “objective”, “universal”, or “necessary” conclusions that the criticized moral systems arrive at are thus only synthetic truths, not the analytical truths that one would wish to establish.And furthermore, intersubjectivity neither entails the conclusion that one is allowed to transcend the barrier between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning nor that one, ex analogia, is permitted to transcend the barrier between subjective knowledge and objective knowledge (the barrier between relative knowledge and absolute knowledge). a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 283 124 Mautner, “Inledning,” p. 6 and 10.
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