acteristic of any non-positivistic theory or notion of law, as for example, natural law. However, one must keep in mind that this specific line of reasoning (truth-relativism and legal policy-making) constitutes nothing but a rhetorical figure attempting to give various psychological interests and needs legal justification and legitimacy by arguing that such needs are not only subjective needs, but that in reality (by being valuable) they express objectively valid interests and needs. It is thus safe to conclude that Hägerström’s analysis of the moral sciences does not make the establishment of moral obligations impossible.What Hägerström concludes is that moral obligations are neither absolute nor objective; they are relative, the products of certain historical and social settings - that is, socially accepted mores.These are mores that are binding and to which the recipients gain access by being members of a certain society and by actively sharing and understanding the emotional and spiritual life of that community. According to Hägerström, it is through the social reception of mores and an acquaintance with other persons in relation to their emotional life that the moral subject gains the ability to decide what he or she is obliged to do, or refrain from doing, in that society.This, however, does not constitute an objective obligation that the moral subject of necessity has to embrace on objective grounds. Because if a moral subject lacks certain principles of valuation, then that moral subject cannot gain knowledge of the mores of that society, and consequently those mores will cease to be felt as binding for that person.114 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 279 3. 8 the pos s i b i l i ty of e stabl i shing moral obl igat ions 114 Cf. Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 44; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 90-91.
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