RB 65

upbringing have conditioned the moral agents to think in a particular way.96 For Hägerström, the main problem of moral science was whether or not it was scientifically correct to inquire after the truthof moral ideas. One aspect of this problem is that if one inquires after a moral idea’s truth value, it becomes necessary to introduce an element that is foreign to the ought (obligation) itself and foreign to the notion of a supreme value, as well as to connect this foreign element with the normative elements.The foreign element, which Hägerström deems to be necessary to introduce, is the demand for a reality-based fact that will validate the claim for moral truth. According to Hägerström’s dogmatic argument, the problem is that reality itself, even if we assume it to be an absolute reality, can never entail a supreme value. Regardless of the supreme value’s possible expression through a divine will it, the supreme value, will neither entail an absolute obligation to obey it nor entail the corollary that obeying the supreme value or divine will has a supreme value in itself.97 One must thus maintain the scientific distinction between reality and value, as:“Existence and value signify something entirely different.Therefore value cannot be included within existence. A moral authority or norm, as a reality which is good in itself, is, objectively regarded, something absurd.”98 Hence, in order to objectively determine the difference between right and wrong it becomes necessary to make it possible to investigate the difference between right and wrong in a purely objective manner, lacking all subjective influences.99 a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 273 3. 4 the dete rminat ion of moral truths 96 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 38; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 86-87. 97 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 40; “Moral Propositions,” p. 87. 98 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 40; “Moral Propositions,” p. 87. Swedish: “Tillvaro och värde betyda något helt annat. Därför kan värdet icke vara inneslutet i tillvaron. En moralisk auktoritet eller norm såsom en i sig själv god verklighet är, objektive sett, något orimligt.” 99 Cf. Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 41; “Moral Propositions,” p. 88.

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