itself in the postulated universally binding power of the internalized system of morality (a sense of binding power that the noninternalized systems lack). Because the internalized systems of morality appear to have near metaphysical reality and supernatural origin, they are assumed to exist autonomously in relation to external causes and factors. For in comparison with non-internalized morality, internalized morality neither appears to have any external (natural) causes, such as an external authority situated in the physical world, an external positive authority, nor to depend upon a such external authorities for its normative validity, which makes the autonomous intrinsic validity of the moral idea all the more persuasive.92 In other words, what Hägerström describes is moral subjectivism of the idealistic variety. Furthermore, to disengage morality from worldly authorities bound to specific territories allows the leap of logic that internalized morality possesses validity independent of spatial factors.93 This paves the way for the supposition that internalized morality, on account of its intrinsic autonomy, is universal and therefore unconditionally absolute.94 However, the fact that morals have been internalized by a large number of moral agents does not necessarily demonstrate the existence of an objective, unconditional, and universal morality in the form of some absolute religious moral authority (God).95 What the actual internalization of morality demonstrates is that several hundreds of years of religious p a r t i v, c h a p t e r 3 272 92 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” pp. 37-38; “Moral Propositions,” p. 86.The footnote at pp. 37-38 is interesting as it refers to Hägerström’s original manuscript in which he wrote that it is also the case in other moral systems, such as those in Buddhism, natural law, Hellenism, and Enlightenment, that the absolute ought or obligation is a logical necessity, valid irrespective of any external sanctions or any volitions. These natural obligations are valid not by extrinsic necessity as much as intrinsic necessity and even if God would have been of a different opinion (see Hugo Grotius). 93 N.B.The similarities between this conception of the validity of morals and that of natural law, which is a set of legal norms that are assumed to posses validity independent of historical factors. 94 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” pp. 37-38; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 85-86. See note 92, above. 95 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 38; “Moral Propositions,” p. 86.
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