cepts in question.80 But Hägerström’s comment is that this defense is self-defeating and untenable, since: “It is as if one said, ‘God is just - but in connection with the idea of his justice, we must disregard from what we mean by justice’.”81 Even if it is possible to imagine a supernatural will having the qualities needed to connect the natural and the supernatural worlds, the original problem would still remain, because the existence of such a connection invariably fails to help determine the objective standard of morals and valuations. Because, if the moral principle of a supernatural will is applied to a natural will, then it still remains to be explained how the causality between the supernatural and the non-supernatural can be maintained in a logically valid manner.82 Furthermore, even if the supernatural will brings harmony to different goals and spheres of interest among the natural moral subjects, it is most probable that these goals and interests will eventually come into conflict with one another. And once this happens, the different goals and spheres of interest will still be in need of a further objective moral principle, an “objective” moral principle that in turn allows anything as being morally defensible, whereby the supreme objectivity and absoluteness of the moral principle itself becomes lost.83 Neither will any reference to conscience help objectively to conciliate the protagonistic spheres of interest nor help to establish an objective moral. From the scientific point of view of Kant, it would be disastrous to accept conscience as the scientific standard for moral science, since the establishment of an objective norm in such case is absolutely dependent upon a subjective point of reference, the conscience, rather than an objective point of reference, objectip a r t i v, c h a p t e r 3 268 80 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 32; “Moral Propositions,” p. 81. 81 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 32; “Moral Propositions,” p. 81. Swedish: “Det är som om man sade: Gud är rättvis - men vid tanken på hans rättvisa skola vi se bort från vad vi mena med rättvisa …” 82 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 32; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 81-82. 83 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” pp. 32-33; “Moral Propositions,” p. 82.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=