natural origin.On the contrary, the failure to demonstrate the existence of a natural, causal, or intelligible link between the natural and the supernatural implies that the aforementioned will must be of natural origin rather than supernatural.77 As a matter of consequence, the practical meaning of the supernatural will for any natural moral subject cannot be determined in a non-contradictory manner unless the supernatural will itself attains individual meaning for us. So unless the supernatural will is connected to individual moral interests as they appear in our natural lives, the supernatural will loses all practical relevance for us. Lacking these natural elements, the idea that there exists a supernatural will determining and bestowing objective morality is wanton:“… and the whole is lost in the dim distance.”78 In order to have and maintain any viable claims of validity and meaning in the real world, the supernatural will must comprise demands that can be applied to human rather than supernatural affairs. Accordingly, Hägerström concludes that morality can thus only be “objective” if it concerns itself with human affairs and morality. It is hence only through its natural qualities and determinations that the supernatural will obtains any sensible meaning.79 The metaphysical defense against this kind of critique obviously bases itself upon the assumption that the supernatural qualities of the supernatural elements themselves are safeguarded from scrutiny, which is effectuated by stating the impossibility of understanding or discerning the metaphysical concepts if one does not simultaneously disregard the specific empirical or sensible elements needed in order to comprehend the (metaphysical) cona ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 267 77 Cf. Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 31; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 80-81. 78 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 31; “Moral Propositions,” p. 81. Swedish: “… och det hela förlorar sig i ett töcknigt fjärran.” 79 Cf. Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 31; “Moral Propositions,” p. 81. This manner of reasoning is ex analogia also applicable to the use of metaphysical argumentation, concepts, and things in other sciences such as law. 3. 1. 4 metaphys ical de fense
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