Given Hägerström’s premisses, his critique of Kant’s view follows logically, but it is nevertheless important to describe it, especially since this specific form of critique of metaphysics resurfaces in Hägerström’s analyses of legal philosophy and legal science (where he concludes that they tend to be influenced by natural law and are thus metaphysically influenced, see PartsV-VII).This paradox concerns the real relationship between the supernatural will and those natural wills morally determined by the supernatural will. Hägerström asks: How is it possible for the supernatural to be natural? How is it possible for the supernatural will to be present in our human minds? And finally, how is it possible for the supernatural will to remain supernatural and simultaneously have a real meaning for the natural moral subjects? According to Hägerström, the problem is that the supernatural, the noumenon, as soon as it becomes accessible to a finite mind and present among the natural moral subjects, invariably gains natural determinations. Once the supernatural will is accessible to the finite mind, then the supernatural character of the supernatural will is negated,76 whereby its scientific determination according to Kantian specifications, is degraded from the absolute to the relative.Thus formal logic (the principle of tertium non datur) prohibits the notion of a supernatural will from being used in this manner. The reason is that an analysis of the supernatural will demonstrates that by definition it must be in a state of absolute seclusion from the natural world in order for the supernatural will to retain its supernatural character. Consequently, the notion of a supernatural will that is active in our natural world is unreal, as this notion cannot be upheld in an intelligible, non-contradictory manner.Thus, Hägerström’s concludes that the (allegedly) supernatural will of Kant’s construction cannot possibly be of superp a r t i v, c h a p t e r 3 266 76 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 31; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 80-81. 3. 1. 3 häge r ström’s cri t ique of kant ’s vi ew
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