to determine.68 Evolution can thus only constitute the objective standard of morality if the philosopher a priori (or dogmatically) accepts that evolution constitutes an objective moral standard, as any other premiss must dismiss evolution as being an objective moral standard. If evolution is defined as adaptability, then that specific morality that is most fitting for adaptation must constitute the objectively correct system of morality. Life itself will in such case be and become the standard for morality and valuations.69 But, if this is the case, what happens if different ways of living represent different moral principles? For example, some people’s standards might deny life while other standards only accept a certain qualified way of living as worth living.70The actuality (as well as theoretical possibility) of different paths of life then constitutes evidence refuting the objectivity of evolution as a standard of morality.The objective moral standard can thus not be established through any use of the concept of evolution. Evolution will only show the adaptability of a certain moral standard to new historical or geographical realities, but the intrinsic adaptability of a certain moral system does not demonstrate its intrinsic objective validity (which is a moral category that is autonomous in relation to adaptability). Evolution itself can thus not serve as an objective standard in the manner sought, nor will it help to discover the objective principle of morality.To be more precise, as a fact evolution only tells us that a certain moral standard or system is in accordance with the requirements of evolution, thus evolution fails to reveal the underlying metaphysics that are sought after.To the objectivist, the problem is that the adaptability of a given set of norms does not constitute the sought-after standard, as the objective standard sought-after is an intrinsically and universally valid objective moral standard. In other words, the objective of the objectivist is to find standards of morality that p a r t i v, c h a p t e r 3 264 68 Cf. Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 30; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 79-80. 69 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 30; “Moral Propositions,” p. 80. 70 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 30; “Moral Propositions,” p. 80.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=