ing objectivity and truth must take precedence over any other issue and interest.63 On a general level, the dismissal of objective morality in Hägerström’s inaugural lecture can be understood as being part of a program, regardless of subject matter, to safeguard the objectivity of scientific knowledge by once again reinstating the importance of keeping correspondence in science between object and proposition truly objective. Furthermore, if this program was to be completely effected then a Kantian investigation of the foundations of science in general was called for at all levels. It is thus logical that Hägerström extended his investigations to include his own field of science, practical philosophy. A few years later, inOn the Question of the Notion of Law(1917), Hägerström applies some of the results of his previous research when he makes distinctions between the theoretical and practical value of intentions, emotions, wishes, volitions, judgments and their various relationships to objective predicates as propaedeutic to the subsequent analysis of law.64 Objectivistic moral philosophy, according to Hägerström, is beset with problems that it cannot explain by itself.The first problem that any objectivistic moral theory must explain is the telling empirical observation that history provides a plethora of competing moral systems and competing moral valuations, but fails to provide a single objective or absolute set of moral norms.65 p a r t i v, c h a p t e r 3 262 NB. In this analysis the termought has been used as the equivalent of börat. Robert T. Sandin has translated börat as obligation, which is a choice of words that both gives a legalistic understanding of Hägerström’s ideas in this respect as well as failing to convey the full philosophical meaning of his terminology as well as his German influences. 3. 1 unsolved problems in obj ect ivi st ic moral phi losophy 63 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” p. 33; “Moral Propositions,” p. 82. 64 Hägerström, Objektiva rättens begrepp, pp. 45-51; “The Notion of Law,” pp. 109-116. 65 Hägerström, “Moraliska föreställningar,” pp. 27-29; “Moral Propositions,” pp. 77-79.
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