tion of “true”, “real” or “moral” morality? Are these duties relative or absolute? Since morals are not sensory-accessible in the same manner as physical objects, Bjarup’s interpretation of Hägerström’s epistemic theory of morals implies that it is impossible for Hägerström to have any knowledge of morals. However, the gist of Hägerström’s theory of morals is not that it is impossible to have knowledge of valuations, but that it is impossible to have epistemic access to the objective values themselves, as these values themselves are founded in valuations rather than in objects, in other words the values never exist autonomously of the subject, but autonomously of the object. If compared with Bjarup’s analysis, then the specification of Hägerström’s theory entails a considerable difference, as the possibility of having knowledge of valuations (and consequently the possibility of having knowledge of the values emanating or derived from them) tells us that the only system of morals and values that is accessible to man is positive morality, which incidentally is an analysis that is useful when studying Hägerström’s philosophy of law. Bjarup’s analysis, on the other hand, contends that valuations emanate from (objective) values - For how else could one have knowledge of them? p a r t i v, c h a p t e r 2 260
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