retical cognition, logical necessity and determinacy follow from the fact that man holds some manner of thought or thinking as being valuable.39 Hägerström remarks that this line of argumentation by Boström necessitates that the determination of reality, as well as the determination of value, are rendered impossible, as on the one hand reality is determined by value, and on the other, value is determined by value in infinitum.40 Hägerström comments the consequences of Boström by questioning whether or not it is epistemologically and scientifically defensible to include evaluative aspects in theoretical discourses.41 The issue at hand is thus the nature of theoretical and scientific knowledge:What constitutes scientific knowledge? Is it purely theoretical, or also practical? Should theoretical and scientific knowledge be decided upon the basis of practical considerations or theoretical considerations? And finally, should truth be decided without any references at all to values? In connection with the discussion on Boström’s philosophy, Hägerström briefly discusses the standpoints of a few contemporary philosophers who, according to Hägerström’s analysis, indiscriminately apply evaluative (emotive) principles when determining objective knowledge and truth. Hugo Münsterberg (Philosophie der Werte, 1908):Truth is just a supra-individual value.A judgment’s truthvalue is decided by its supra-individual value, but what poses a problem is that in Münsterberg’s system truth is one of several competing supra-individual values, such as aesthetic, ethical, and metaphysical values, which are placed on an equal footing with truth in theoretical investigations proper, such as ontological and epistemological ina ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 253 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 2 . 2 . 2 evaluat ions , value s , and sci ence wi th re fe rence to knowledge and truth
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