Absolute’s capability of constituting the Finite’s cause is impossible to conceive without including an evaluative perspective, a telos, in the premisses. The determination of the Absolute and the Finite would actually be impossible to carry through if the determinative principle itself lacked an evaluative perspective. Accordingly, unless the objects at hand were morally evaluated in one way or another it would have been impossible for Boström to construct his system in a coherent manner, which clearly shows the effects of the subjective (emotive) positions in his ontology and epistemology. In emotive positions of philosophy, subjective values necessarily are primary in comparison with objective characteristics, and consequently objective becomes substituted for subjective. According to Boström’s philosophy, any analysis must be supplemented with values and evaluations in order to establish the real, the qualified, difference between the Absolute and the Finite. If this is the case, not even the Finite can be determined as being real without an implicit use of valuations, especially since Boström’s philosophy only allows the Finite itself to be real by grace of the Absolute, and, in turn, the Absolute itself is determined through the inclusion of normative valuations as well as evaluations of facts.37 But this is not entirely satisfactory from any point of view, for as Hägerström remarks, if this is the case then the Essence must be possible to posit as real, irrespective of any value considerations, in order for it to be meaningful to determine anything as being valuable for the Essence. Hence, unless the Essence can be thought of in a purely theoretical manner, it loses any theoretical meaning in the objective determination of what is valuable according to the Essence itself.38 Boström’s theoretical philosophy applies valuations in several other aspects as well, for instance, in the determination of theop a r t i v, c h a p t e r 2 252 37 Ibid., p. 72. See also Boström’s account of his own ideas contending, inter alia, with apodictic certainty, that: a) that the true state necessarily is a monarchy; and b) that the only rationally valid model of representation is one that has four estates (i.e. the Swedish model). Boström, “Boström, Christopher Jacob,” §§ 71 and 81-83, et passim. 38 Hägerström, “Värdepsykologien,” p. 72.
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