ment” - for the primary valuation itself contains a regular judgment as well as a subjective feeling vis-à-vis the same object. In his analysis of Immanuel Kant’s and Christopher Jakob Boström’s respective attempts to distinguish between theoretical and practical judgments, Hägerström concludes that in their respective determinations of the theoretical and the practical judgment they falter in their distinctions between these forms.While Kant fails to uphold a strict separation between the valuation and the value, Boström fails to exclude teleological evaluations from the objective determination of reality. Kant’s confusion of theoretical and practical judgments is attributed to his unconscious sophistry,30 which confuses the object of the perception with the perception itself, whereby the intellectual determination of the objective value is rendered impossible, since what is left is the evaluation itself (which is either relative or absolute).31 All in all, Kant’s confusion demonstrates what happens when ontology and epistemology are confused with each other. According to Boström’s philosophy, the ought itself is a category determinable through a purely intellectual operation, an operation refraining from confusing the ought with a certain being. Since ethics, legal philosophy, and the philosophy of religion are sciences, and science is (by virtue of its character of qualified knowledge) a manifestation of reason itself,32 then it is possible, ex analogia, to determine the true tasks and goals for the human will, as Boström holds that the science of ethics itself determinates, ascertains, and establishes the free will of Man.33 The reasons for p a r t i v, c h a p t e r 2 250 2 . 2 the di st inct ion betwe en Theoretical and Practical judgments 30 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., p. 71. For a complete account of Boström’s philosophy see Boström’s own description: Boström, “Boström, Christopher Jacob.” 33 Hägerström, “Värdepsykologien,” p. 71.
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