Second, that the content of the feeling (like or dislike) is actually immanent in the perceived object.26 Third, that there exists an objective and universally applicable causal relationship between the object and the feeling.Thus, the feeling, emotion, is itself invariably caused by the characteristics of the object, whereby an object, on account of its own intrinsic qualities, causes a certain objective disposition towards itself. Hägerström’s explanation of the genesis of feelings and emotions places the cause of the feelings and emotions exclusively inside the subjective frame of mind. Since a feeling never can constitute a theoretical judgment proper, then the verification of objectivism necessitates that the epistemological barrier between the subjective frame of mind and the true emotive characteristics of the thing, in essence Das Ding an sich, is transcended, whereby Hägerström holds that neither option is tenable.27 In fact, the content of a feeling is never the perceived (appraised) object in question, but is rather another mental act, namely a sensation, that has the perceived object as its content.28 And since neither of the two positions, above, are tenable, then what is left is the primary valuation, which itself, by means of a judgment, refers to an object, but does so subjectively, thereby determining the value of the object.29 Hägerström’s conclusion boils down to this tautological observation: Since it is the subjective position (feeling) that bestows the primary valuation of an object with its subjective (emotive) determination, it is thus the subjective position that bestows the conception with its emotive meaning. And it is on the basis of this relationship between the subjective and objective position upon which values are founded, hence values are determined in the subjective position vis-à-vis a specific object, which in turn explains why Hägerström calls the primary valuation “a judga ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 249 26 Ibid., p. 23. 27 Ibid., p. 26. 28 Ibid., p. 24. 29 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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