a relationship entailing that the judgment or consciousness of an object is followed by a subjective position to that specific consciousness. Finally, the relationship between the subject and the object making up a valuation cannot be construed as if it were this specific relationship itself that was the subjective position actually determining the conception of the object (as such a conclusion contradicts Hägerström’s objectivistic standpoint).23 No matter what, a conception of an object only signifies that the object of the conception is apprehended; a conception of an object neither means that the object itself is determined through this conception, nor that it is given the attributes and characteristics immanent in the conception itself.The conception itself gathers its determinateness of content (Swedish: innehållsbestämdhet) from the object itself, and does so apparently without any subjective interference.24 A pure conception of an object, therefore, cannot transfer any values to the object itself. Consequently, Hägerström argues that it is objectively impossible to perceive intrinsic value characteristics of objects that give rise to desire or dislike of an object in the same manner as it is possible to directly perceive other attributes of an object, such as, for instance, color, weight, height, volume, density, and chemical composition. Hägerström’s argument is that objectivism’s contention of the objective possibility of perceiving desire or dislike intrinsic to an object implies that the very judgment, conception, or apprehension of an object, mysteriously bestows and furnishes the object in question with the objective qualities of desire or dislike.25 According to Hägerström’s argument the corollary of the theory that the content of a feeling, emotion, is a perceived object (objective desirability or despicability, like or dislike) is: First, that the content of the feeling (like or dislike) itself is an actual or factual objective attribute or characteristic of the perceived object. p a r t i v, c h a p t e r 2 248 23 Ibid., p. 74. 24 Ibid., p. 21. 25 Cf. ibid., p. 22.
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