Hägerström’s rejection of value objectivism and subjectivism can be traced back to 1907-1908 when he subjects these notions to a severe critique.18 In “Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien” (1910), he argues that purely theoretical knowledge about objective valuations and values is impossible.This theory (based upon Hägerström’s analyses of, among others, the axiological theories of Meinong, Lipps, Maier, Brentano, Kant, and Boström) concludes that purely theoretical judgments can never reveal any objective values.19 A further conclusion was that it was urgent that sharper distinctions were made between theoretical judgments and practical judgments than those performed up until then (which incidentally is a conclusion that expresses another of Hägerström’s leading principles, the separation of is or being, fromought).20 To recapitulate, according to Hägerström’s theory of judgments a theoretical judgment only establishes objective facts, but never objective values, the inherent truth value or validity of value is thus a scientific non-issue.This is because if facts are to gain any value-laden meaning at all, then they must be subjected to an p a r t i v 246 Case Study: “Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien” - Moral Philosophy chap te r 2 18 Hägerström, “I moralpsykologiska frågor I,” review of Kristian Birch-Reichenwald Aars: Gut und Böse. Zur Psychologie der Moralgefühle (Christiania 1907), Psyke.Tidskrift för psykologisk forskning 2 (1907): passim; “I moralpsykologiska frågor II,”passim. 19 Hägerström,“Kritiska punkter i värdepsykologien,” inFestskrift tillägnad E.O. Burman, pp. 61-62, et passim. 20 About Kant and Boström’s confusion of valuations and values (ontological confusion) and value and cognition (epistemological confusion), see ibid., pp. 69-73. Footnote 2 on pp. 72-73 is especially interesting in this aspect as it summarizes Hägerström’s analysis of several contemporary philosophers confusion regarding this issue. See also Logren, Huvuddragen, p. 440.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=