tained, then the scientific value of scientific concepts would diminish to nothing. But what (according to Hägerström’s analysis) makes the value-judgment deceptive is that it has a scientific, theoretical form predicating the objective correspondence between values and objects. However, the value-judgment lacks theoretical content, as it does not predicate anything objective of reality other than the subject’s subjective connection between value and fact.16 Since value-judgments do not constitute proper theoretical judgments, Hägerström’s principle of moral philosophy is that the truth value of a value-judgment is impossible to determine, hence value-judgments shall be excluded from proper theoretical knowledge and scientific reasoning. Proper judgments only have one object, reality.Value-judgments, on the contrary, express a speaker’s beliefs, sentiments, and interests with reference to a certain thing, act, or state of affairs.Values and value-judgments do not in fact express anything objectively real having any objective bearing on this world.They are neither relations nor qualities objectively belonging to a set of things or a single thing.Values (per se) are therefore not possible to prove in any scientifically acceptablemanner as being objectively true, and can therefore not be objective (as moral objectivism,on the other hand,maintains).17 Value-judgments do not express anything objectively known about the object of the expression, and consequently they express something other than facts or reality.And since Hägerström considered that science should state facts and refer to (objective) reality,the natural conclusionmust be that value-judgments must be excluded fromscientific argumentation. a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 245 moral and the legal case, normative reality (understood as positively accepted norms) can only be scientifically expressed dogmatically, that is als … ob, in a system fictively postulating the unquestioned normative authority of certain rules of conduct, which the dogmatician has to investigate logically. 16 Cf. Petersson, Värdeteori, pp. 45-58 and 112-118. 17 Cf. The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, Bunnin and Tsui-James, eds., pp. 28-34. - An account of the different meta-ethical theories and their relationships to one another.
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