judgments, which, even though they resemble one another, are different types of propositions, the former a declaration of intent and the latter a theoretical proposition whose truth value can be determined.9 A value-judgment, apart from being understood as a predicate, may also be understood as a functional utterance in which we in fact only express an imperative, but not a proper judgment predicating the existence of a real value attached to a thing or an act. The act of expressing an imperative only has a suggestive effect on our will towards the performance of a certain act.An imperative does not actually express any objectively real state of affairs - for example, that a duty is objectively real. On the contrary, the imperative, with regard to reality, only expresses a wished or willed state of affairs corresponding to the volitions, sentiments or interests of the speaker.10 For instance, according to Hägerström’s strict theory the sentence “Thou shall not steal” does not express objectively real facts, it is just an appeal.Value-judgments, as such, must thus be regarded as lacking any form of intrinsic truth value. According to Professor Ingemar Hedenius (1908-1982), with his slight modification to Hägerström’s theory, it is possible to express value-judgments that have truth value, provided that the judgment is reformulated in a dogmatic direction aimed at determining whether a certain act is, or is not, in accordance with a specific set of rules, morals, taste, ethics, esthetics and so forth.11 It is only in this manner that a value-judgment may be construed a ca l l f o r s c i e n t i f i c p u r i t y 243 1. 2 normat ive expre s s ions and the i r funct ion 9 Hägerström, Till frågan om den objektiva rättens begrepp I. Viljeteorien, p. 45; “On the Question of the Notion of Law,” in Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals: Axel Hägerström, p. 109. 10 Hägerström, “Hägerström.”; “The Philosophy of Axel Hägerström.” 11 Hedenius, Om rätt och moral, pp. 56-57;“Analysen av äganderättsbegreppet,” inFilosofi och rättsvetenskap, p. 39. Even though Professor Hedenius, who had his first philosophical schooling under the influence of the Uppsala School, later criticized some of its theories his remarks in this matter helped in clarifying an important aspect of the question regarding the truth value of a value judgment.This had hitherto, at best, only been implied by Hägerström, namely the fact that value judgments could have
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MjYyNDk=